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1 Introduction
International integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy.
Integrated markets are to a large extent regulated by national regulatory bodies that
pursue policies aimed at furthering narrow national interests. Moreover, countries have
often chosen diﬀerent approaches to market and regulatory reform (as in several energy
markets), which have raised concerns about the overall eﬃciency of the system, and in
particular whether there is a need for improved coordination of national regulatory policies
and institutions in these sectors.
One aspect that regulatory policies must deal with is the restructuring via mergers
and acquisitions that has taken place partly as a consequence of deregulation and lib-
eralisation. These developments have occurred both at a national level, in the form of
domestic firms merging with or acquiring other domestic firms, and at an international
level, where firms have merged with or acquired targets across national borders. For in-
stance EDF-GDF, the former French energy monopolist, has acquired London Electricity,
an important UK energy provider, and is planning expansion into other European national
energy markets. In Scandinavia the Swedish company Vattenfall has expanded through
mergers and acquisitions both nationally and to a significant extent in other Scandinavian
countries, including Norway.
Firms may merge for a variety of reasons, including increased profit opportunities
associated with synergy gains, improved market access and increased market power. In
regulated industries, including gas and electricity, such profit opportunities are influenced
by the regulatory regime. In particular, when firms in diﬀerent countries merge, the
consolidated enterprise will relate to national regulatory bodies in all the countries where
it operates. This opens up the possibility for the firm of strategically exploiting non-
coordinated behaviour on the part of these bodies, and to some extent pitting the bodies
against each other. The profit opportunities associated with this strategic position may
then be another motive for national firms to merge internationally. Cross-border mergers
may thus in part be motivated precisely by a lack of international regulatory coordination.
The strategic position of multinationals in regulated industries poses challenges for
regulatory policy and for international coordination of such policies. One possibly impor-
tant aspect of this challenge is the implications that the overall international regulatory
regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic merger activity. In particular, do non-
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coordinated policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall ineﬃcient, and is this
then (another) argument for international coordination of such policies? In this paper we
address precisely this issue.
An interesting finding is that the answer to the posed question may be negative; thus
the analysis reveals that non-coordinated regulatory policies may induce mergers that are
overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated regulation.
This finding thus points to the possibility that international coordination of regulatory
policies may have detrimental eﬀects for overall welfare.
To explain this result one may start from the observation that detrimental eﬀects of
international cooperation typically only arise in ‘second-best’ settings where regulators
have a limited set of instruments and means to influence economic agents’ decisions.1 We
consider a setting where regulators (realistically) have limited means to influence firms’
decisions with respect to mergers and acquisitions, and in particular cannot commit to
policies that leave firms with pure profits (rents) that may motivate such decisions. We
assume that regulators in line with welfare considerations will, for a given market structure,
pursue policies that benefit consumers by leaving as little rent as possible in regulated
firms. But the opportunities to extract such rents are diﬀerent under cooperative compared
to non-cooperative regulatory regimes. In the non-cooperative case a multinational firm
may to some extent pit a national regulator against foreign regulators by a (more or less
implicit) threat of moving nationally desirable activities abroad. Such a credible threat
may ‘soften’ the national regulator and force her to leave more rents to the firm. In
equilibrium the multinational enterprise can thus, due to the strategic position facilitated
by its opportunities to move activities internationally, obtain a rent; a mobility rent. It
would not be possible to obtain this rent if policies were fully coordinated, so that all
national regulators related to the firm on a cooperative basis. We point out that this
rent; the mobility rent associated with multinational operations under non-cooperative
regulation, can be a decisive motive for cross-border mergers. Moreover, such mergers
may be socially desirable. Hence it follows that non-cooperative regulation may be overall
beneficial compared to a fully cooperative regulatory regime.
1This is of course a quite general point. In the theory of optimal time consistent taxation, it is well
known that various impediments to taxation can be a blessing in disguise, since the implicit commitment
to lower taxation can bring forth investments in capital or education, or the like. See, for example, Konrad
and Lommerud (2001), Konrad (2001) and Andersson and Konrad (2003).
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Our focus on and analysis of the links between regulatory regimes and merger activity
is to our best knowledge new. The regulation literature has analysed various aspects of
equilibrium policies when firms are subject to multiple regulatory bodies. This literature
includes Baron (1985), Laﬀont and Tirole (1991), Stole (1992), Martimort (1996a,b), Bond
and Gresik (1996), and Calzolari (2001, 2004). There are also some parallel issues in
the literature on taxation of multinational enterprises and strategic tax policy (see, e.g.,
Markusen (1995), Haaparanta (1996) and Olsen and Osmundsen (2001) ). Neither of
these literatures has considered the links to merger activity. In our model regulators
oversee market access (via a network), and their task is to regulate the price of this access.
The received literature on access pricing (see, e.g., Armstrong (2002) for an overview)
does not make the link to merger activity either. Bassanini and Poyet (2005) study
non-coordinated international regulation of network access, but assume a competitive
industry. Nese and Straume (2005) analyse how national regulators can use access prices
(or other tax instruments) strategically to shift rents among diﬀerent parts of a successive
international oligopoly. Again, merger is not an issue.
There are close structural similarities between the model presented here and the rela-
tively large literature on mergers in vertical industrial structures. Examples of this line of
work include Horn andWolinsky (1988), Inderst andWey (2003), Lommerud, Straume and
Sørgard (2005, 2006), O’Brien and Shaﬀer (2005) and Symeonidis (2005). The production
firms in the model will then be ‘downstream’ firms that supply to a market, while the
regulators will be ‘upstream’ input suppliers (supplying ‘access’). The present model adds
to this literature on several counts. Firstly, the upstream agents are here regulators that
have a broader objective function than profit-maximising input suppliers. Secondly, many
of the mentioned articles only study the consequences of downstream mergers — while we
look at the possibility of diﬀerent types of downstream mergers and how the anticipation
of such mergers influence upstream cooperation. Thirdly, we allow for the upstream agent
to use a two-part tariﬀ. Two-part tariﬀs are considered also in Ziss (1995) and Milliou
and Petrakis (2005), but they only look at the profitability of upstream mergers.
There are also links to the literature on strategic trade policy, as the regulated access
price in our model can be manipulated to help a domestic firm to gain international market
share. The paper in this tradition that lies closest to us is Huck and Konrad (2004).
This paper finds that active strategic trade policy can lead firms to choose national over
international mergers because this triggers higher per-unit subsidies of production. There
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are many diﬀerences between this work and our own model. We allow the regulator to use
a two-part regulatory scheme. This takes away the attraction of national mergers: Even
though they could spur increased strategic per-unit subsidies (lower per-unit access prices),
this benefit will be confiscated through an increase in the lump-sum tax element. Moreover,
a central focus in our paper is how possible merger choices influences the benefits from
international policy coordination, something which is not an issue in Huck and Konrad.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in Section
2. Section 3 studies the baseline case of cooperative regulation and merger incentives
in this case. A corresponding analysis of non-cooperative regulation is found in Section
4. Section 5 uses an endogenous merger model to predict what mergers will take place
in the equilibrium market structure under diﬀerent assumptions about the regulatory
regime. Section 6 is devoted to social welfare issues. After asking what types of mergers
are socially desirable under cooperative or non-cooperative regulation, we turn to the
question if international policy cooperation would be beneficial. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Model
Consider an industry with initially four single-plant firms located in two countries; firms
(plants) 1 and 2 are located in country A, whereas firms (plants) 3 and 4 are located in
country B.2 The firms produce a homogenous good (e.g., electricity or natural gas) which
is exported to a third country. Third-market exports require access to a transportation
network, where the access price (assumed to be a two-part tariﬀ) is regulated by the
respective national governments. We further assume that the firms compete á la Cournot
in the export market.
Third-market demand for the good is given by an inverse demand function
p = a− b
4X
i=1
qi, (1)
where p is the market-clearing price and qi is quantity supplied from plant i. The variable
cost of production at each plant is given by the convex cost function C (qi). For simplicity,
2Regarding notation, we use the indices j and i for countries and plants, respectively, while the set of
plants located in country j is given by Nj . We will also intermittently use subscript −j to denote the
other country than j. Finally, where appropriate, we use superscripts d and c for market structures with
domestic and cross-border mergers, respectively.
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we let this function take on a simple quadratic form: C (qi) = c2q
2
i . The firms must also
incur a firm-specific fixed cost K. In the decentralised market structure, with no mergers,
profits of firm i, located in country j, are then given by
πi = (p− wj) qi −C (qi)−K − Tj , i ∈ Nj , (2)
where wj and Tj constitute the two-part tariﬀ for access to the transportation network in
country j.
National regulators are concerned about maximising national welfare, which — in the
absence of domestic consumers — is assumed to be given by a weighted sum of public
revenue and private profits. In the decentralised market structure, national welfare in
country j is given by
Wj = 2Tj + wj
X
i∈Nj
qi + α
X
i∈Nj
πi, α < 1. (3)
The assumption that α is strictly less than one implies that the regulator will extract all
private profits if she is costlessly able to do so. The above specification of welfare also
implicitly rests on the assumption that there are no costs associated with the operation
of the transportation network (i.e., transportation costs are zero).3
We consider the following game:
Stage 0: The firms decide whether to merge domestically or cross-border, if at all.
Stage 1: The national regulators set, cooperatively or non-cooperatively, access prices,
given by (wj , Tj) .
Stage 2: The firms choose outputs simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
Placing the merger decisions at the outset of the game reflects the fact that mergers
are indeed long-term decisions with a considerable degree of commitment involved.
For clarity of analysis, we restrict attention to two-firm mergers. In order to illustrate
the main workings of the model, we start out by characterising the equilibria in all sym-
metrical market structures under diﬀerent regulatory regimes. We then proceed to make
predictions about the equilibrium market structure of the full game.
3Positive transportation costs can easily be introduced, but oﬀer no additional insight to our analysis.
6
3 Cooperative regulation
As a benchmark for comparison, we start out by considering the case where access regula-
tion is harmonised across borders. In the decentralised market structure, profit maximising
output quantities are given by
qi∈Nj =
a (b+ c)− (3b+ c)wj + 2bw−j
(5b+ c) (b+ c)
. (4)
Maximisation of global welfare implies that marginal access prices must satisfy the first-
order conditions
∂ (WA +WB)
∂wj
= 0, (5)
while the fixed fees must be set so that the participation constraints are satisfied:
πi ≥ 0. (6)
Solving (5) and (6), assuming that the participation constraints hold with equality,
and taking into account that the choice of wj aﬀects the optimal choice of Tj , we derive
the optimal two-part tariﬀs:
wj =
3ab
8b+ c
, (7)
Tj =
(2b+ c) a2
2 (8b+ c)2
−K. (8)
We observe that optimal access pricing involves setting a marginal access price in excess
of marginal transportation costs, i.e., wj > 0. This is done to correct for the negative
competition externality in the product market. By cooperative regulation, the cartel
output — which maximises joint profits — can be implemented. Private profits can then be
fully extracted through the fixed fee, Tj , leaving the firms with zero profits in equilibrium.
3.1 Mergers
Focusing on two-firm mergers, we consider the cases where the firms in the industry merge
either domestically or cross-border, implying that the number of firms is reduced from 4
to 2. We assume that a merger entails a cost synergy, which takes the form of fixed-cost
savings,4 and we also allow for the possibility that the size of these fixed-cost savings
4The main mechanisms of the model, and thus our main results, does not particularly depend on the
source of merger synergies. Fixed cost savings are thus chosen for analytical simplicity.
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depends on whether the merger is domestic or cross-border. More specifically, we assume
that cost savings in a domestic and cross-border merger, respectively, are θdK and θcK,
where θd, θc ∈ (0, 1).
In the case of domestic mergers, profits for the merged firms are given by
π1+2 = (p−wA) (q1 + q2)−C (q1)−C (q2)− (2− θd)K − TA, (9)
π3+4 = (p− wB) (q3 + q4)−C (q3)−C (q4)− (2− θd)K − TB, (10)
from which we can derive optimal outputs in the Cournot game:
qdi∈Nj =
a (2b+ c)− wj (4b+ c) + 2bw−j
(2b+ c) (6b+ c)
. (11)
In the case of cross-border mergers, on the other hand, profits in one of the two possible
ownership structures are given by
π1+3 = (p− wA) q1 + (p− wB) q3 − C (q1)−C (q3)− (2− θc)K − TA − TB, (12)
π2+4 = (p− wA) q2 + (p− wB) q4 − C (q2)−C (q4)− (2− θc)K − TA − TB. (13)
Profit-maximising outputs are found to be
qci∈Nj =
ac−wj (3b+ c) + 3bw−j
c (6b+ c)
. (14)
When analysing optimal access regulation we make the assumption that, in the case of
cross-border mergers, profits are divided equally between share-holders in the two coun-
tries.5 With cross-border harmonisation of access regulation, the regulators are always able
to implement the full cartel output and extract all profits in equilibrium. The marginal
access price is equal regardless of the type of merger, and given by
wdj = w
c
j =
2ba
8b+ c
. (15)
Comparing (7) and (15), we observe that a more concentrated market structure implies
a marginal access price closer to marginal transportation costs, as we would expect. The
fixed fee, on the other hand, depends on the size of merger synergies:
T dj =
(4b+ c) a2
(8b+ c)2
− (2− θd) , (16)
T cj =
1
2
½
(4b+ c) a2
(8b+ c)2
− (2− θc)
¾
. (17)
5 In other words, half of the total profits generated in an internationally merged firm enters the objective
function of a domestic regulator. It should be stressed, though, that the main thrust of the analysis does
not depend on a particular sharing rule.
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4 Non-cooperative regulation
Now we consider the case where national regulators set access prices simultaneously and
non-cooperatively. We start out by analysing the regulatory game in the decentralised
market structure.
Equilibrium access prices must satisfy
∂Wj
∂wj
= 0, (18)
and
πi ≥ 0. (19)
Using (4), equilibrium access prices are given by
wj =
ab (c− b)
(c+ 7b) (2b+ c)
, (20)
Tj =
(3b+ c)2 a2
2 (2b+ c) (c+ 7b)2
−K. (21)
In the absence of international coordination, national regulators must now balance
two opposing incentives in framing the optimal regulatory policies. One the one hand,
national regulators have incentives to use the marginal access price to correct for a neg-
ative externality between domestic competitors, moving the market equilibrium closer to
the cartel outcome. One the other hand, there is also an incentive to use the marginal
access price as a strategic trade policy instrument. By lowering wj from the cooperative
equilibrium level, the regulator in country j can ensure — all else equal — that a larger
share of the export market is served by the firms located in j. Since outputs are strategic
substitutes in the product market game, this is a profitable deviation.6 Consequently, the
equilibrium level of wj is lower when access pricing is not internationally coordinated.7
The relative strengths of these opposing incentives are determined by the degree of con-
vexity in production costs, measured by the parameter c. Strategic trade policy is more
eﬀective when c is low. Thus, a lower c increases rent-shifting incentives and leads to a
lower equilibrium value of wj . From (20) we see that marginal access prices will be set
below marginal transportation costs in equilibrium (i.e., wj < 0) if c < b.
6See, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1985).
7This is easily confirmed by a comparison of (7) and (20).
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Domestic mergers
Solving (18) and (19) by using (11), equilibrium access pricing when firms merge
domestically is given by
wdj =
−4b2a
10bc+ 20b2 + c2
, (22)
T dj =
(4b+ c)3 a2
(10bc+ 20b2 + c2)2
− (2− θd)K. (23)
Regulators are still able to extract all private profits.
The previously discussed negative externality on domestic competitors is now fully
internalised by the firms themselves through mergers. Thus, when the market structure is
characterised by national monopolies, only rent-shifting incentives matter for the choice
of marginal access prices in the non-cooperative policy game. Consequently, domestic
mergers lead to lower equilibrium levels of wj . Indeed, from (22) we see that the regulators
will always set marginal access prices below marginal transportation costs in equilibrium.
Cross-border mergers
Cross-border mergers increase the flexibility of the merging parties, in the sense that
a merged firm can choose to serve the export market from both or either of the exporting
countries. Under non-cooperative regulation, this flexibility serves as a credible threat
vis-á-vis national regulators. The regulator in country j must now make sure that she
oﬀers an access price for the transportation network that discourages the internationally
merged firms to re-locate all export production to the other country.
Let bπm (j) denote the profits earned by the merged firm m when serving the export
market only from country j (given that the other firm uses both plants for export produc-
tion). Optimal access regulation in the non-cooperative regime must now also satisfy the
following mobility constraint for each merged firm:
πm ≥ bπm (j) . (24)
It is straightforward to derive that
bπm (j) = ((2b+ c) a− (c+ 3b)wj + bw−j)2 (2b+ c)
2 (6b2 + c2 + 6bc)2
− (2− θc)K − Tj . (25)
On the other hand, if the merged firms serve the export market from both countries,
equilibrium profits are found by inserting (14) into (12) or (13), and given by
πm =
2ca (4b+ c) (a− wA − wB) + η
2c (6b+ c)2
− (2− θc)K − TA − TB, (26)
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where
η :=
¡
8bc+ 18b2 + c2
¢ ¡
w2A +w
2
B
¢
− 4bwAwB (9b+ 2c) > 0.
Applying the mobility constraints, equilibrium access pricing in the non-cooperative
regime with cross-border mergers are given by8
wcj =
abc
¡
αν + 24b3 (3b+ 2c)− 8c2b (b+ c)− c4
¢
αcbν − (2b+ c)' , (27)
T cj =
ca2 (c+ 3b)2 γ
¡
6b2 + c2 + 6bc
¢2
2 (αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
, (28)
where
γ := c4 + 14bc3 + 72b2c2 + 160b3c+ 120b4,
ν := c4 + 12bc3 + 52b2c2 + 102b3c+ 72b4,
' := 324b5 + 612b4c+ 444b3c2 + 142b2c3 + 20bc4 + c5.
We can now state our first main result:9
Proposition 1 Under non-cooperative regulation, there exists a critical value K such that
cross-border mergers yield positive profits in equilibrium if K < K.
Unless fixed costs are too high, non-cooperative regulators are not able to extract all
rents from internationally merged firms in equilibrium. This is due to the merged firms’
ability to play the national regulators out against each other. By credibly threatening to
shift export production to a foreign plant, an internationally merged firm can induce each
national regulator to oﬀer an access price that in eﬀect will leave the firm with positive
profits in equilibrium.10
However, the equilibrium outcome given by (27)-(28) is valid only if fixed costs are
not too high. If K is above the critical level K, the regulators can extract all profits in
the non-cooperative equilibrium without violating the mobility constraint. In this case,
the internationally merged firms do not obtain any strategic advantage from the merger.
8Explicit expressions for the mobility constraints are given in Appendix A.
9All formal proofs are presented in Appendix C.
10We have assumed that merger synergies and fixed costs are independent of whether the merged firms
use both plants (see (25)). If the merged firms could save some fixed costs by using only one plant,
the national regulators would have to leave even more profits to the firms in order to meet the mobility
constraints.
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It is easily shown that K is increasing in the cost-savings factor θ.11 Thus, larger merger
synergies increase the likelihood of profitable cross-border mergers; not because of the
synergies themselves, but because larger synergies make the the threat of production
shifting credible for a larger range of K.
When all private profits are not extracted, it also follows that the weight attached
to profits in the regulators’ objective functions matters for the equilibrium access price.
From (27) it is easily confirmed that wcj is decreasing in α.
5 Equilibrium market structure
Which is the equilibrium market structure if we allow for all possible two-firm mergers? In
order to make predictions about merger formation, we apply the endogenous merger model
introduced by Horn and Persson (2001), who treat the merger process as a cooperative
game of coalition-formation, where the players are free to communicate and write binding
contracts.12
To introduce some more notation, let an ownership structure Mk be a partition of the
set {1, 2, 3, 4} of owners (firms) into coalitions. Allowing only for two-firm mergers, there
are 5 possible market structures, comprising a total of 10 diﬀerent ownership structures.
For example, the market structure with two cross-border mergers can be realised through
two diﬀerent ownership structures: {1 + 3, 2 + 4} and {1 + 4, 2 + 3}. Without going into
details about the theoretical foundations of the merger formation model, the approach
involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures Mk and Mk0 , where Mk
is said to dominate Mk0 if the combined profits of the decisive group of owners are larger
in Mk than in Mk0 . The decisive group of owners are the owners that are expected to
be able to influence whether Mk will be formed instead of Mk0 , and vice versa. We
do not allow side-payments among coalitions, so owners belonging to identical coalitions
in the two structures cannot aﬀect whether Mk will be formed instead of Mk0 , but all
remaining owners can influence this choice and are thus decisive.13 Finally, the solution
11See Appendix C.
12Due to the nature of our model, similar results would be obtained in any plausible model of endogenous
mergers. Since the decentralised market structure implies zero profits in equilibrium, a merger can never
harm non-participating firms. This implies that there are no incentives for ‘pre-emptive mergers’ in our
model.
13See Horn and Persson (2001) for a formal definition of decisive owners.
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concept is the core. Those structures that are in the core (i.e., the structures that are
undominated) are defined as equilibrium ownership structures. We also impose a strict
domination requirement, meaning that the decentralised structure will be preferred to any
other ownership structure unless it is strictly dominated by such a structure. An ε-cost of
merger is suﬃcient to justify this assumption.
Let us now turn to the solution of the full game. Under cooperative regulation, private
profits are always fully extracted in equilibrium. Consequently, the decentralised market
structure is not strictly dominated by any other market structure, and, consequently, no
mergers will take place when regulation is internationally coordinated.
Under non-cooperative regulation, on the other hand, we have shown that firms can
obtain positive profits by merging cross-border. Thus, if K < K, the symmetric market
structure with two cross-border mergers strictly dominates both the decentralised struc-
ture and any market structure involving domestic mergers. However, it is not a priori
clear whether a market structure with only a single cross-border merger is dominated by
the market structure where all firms merge cross-border. This dominance relation is deter-
mined by whether a second cross-border merger is privately profitable. This depends firstly
on whether or not access regulation is discriminatory. With discriminatory regulation, it
is always possible to extract all profits from the non-merged firms. In this case, a second
cross-border merger is always privately profitable. Under non-discriminatory regulation,
on the other hand, the non-merged firms benefit from the laxer regulation induced by a
single cross-border merger. This free-rider eﬀect may be suﬃciently strong to prevent a
second merger.
Proposition 2 (i) Under cooperative regulation, there are no mergers in equilibrium.
(ii) Under non-cooperative, discriminatory regulation, the equilibrium market structure
is two cross-border mergers if K < K.
(iii) Under non-cooperative, non-discriminatory regulation, if θc > eθ ∈ (0, 1), there
exists a critical value eK < K such that the equilibrium market structure is two cross-
border mergers if K ∈
³ eK,K´.
Part (iii) of the Proposition basically states that, with non-discriminatory regulation,
private profitability of a second cross-border merger requires a certain amount of merger
synergies. Otherwise, the aggressive response of the already merged firm will make a
second merger unprofitable, as in a ‘standard’ Cournot homogenous goods oligopoly.
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6 Social welfare
In this section we discuss two interrelated questions regarding social welfare. First, which
types of merger, if any at all, are preferred from a welfare point-of-view? Second, assuming
that merger decisions are endogenously made, is international harmonisation of access
regulation socially desirable? For the first question, we restrict attention to symmetric
market structures.
In the cooperative regulation regime, a social ranking of market structures is straight-
forward. In any market structure, the regulatory parameters are set so that total industry
rents are maximised. Then the following result is trivially established:
Proposition 3 Under cooperative regulation, any mergers are socially desirable if they
yield some cost synergies. The socially most preferable market structure is the one in
which the largest merger synergies are realised.
In the non-cooperative regulation regime, things are far less straightforward. However,
by comparing the diﬀerent equilibrium welfare expressions reported in Appendix B, we
can establish the following results:
Proposition 4 Assume that regulation is non-cooperative.
(i) Compared with the decentralised structure, domestic mergers are always welfare
improving, while cross-border mergers are welfare improving if α or K is suﬃciently high.
(ii) Comparing domestic and cross-border mergers, and assuming that cost synergies
are identical in both types of merger, cross-border mergers are always socially preferred if
α is suﬃciently high, while domestic mergers are preferred if α and K are suﬃciently low.
Due to the rent-generating eﬀect of a more concentrated market structure, domestic
mergers are always welfare improving, even in the absence of cost synergies. On the other
hand, if firms merge cross-border, all pure profits cannot be extracted by the regulators.
Consequently, the welfare eﬀect of cross-border mergers depends on how private profits
are evaluated. If α is suﬃciently high, there is a low social cost of leaving pure profits in
the hands of the firms, and cross-border mergers are always welfare improving (relative
to no mergers). In general, though, the welfare loss of not being able to extract all rents
must be weighed against the merger-induced increase in total rents. Thus, for low levels
of α it takes a suﬃciently high level of K to make cross-border mergers welfare improving.
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Finally, the welfare ranking of domestic versus cross-border mergers follows much the
same logic. If both types of merger are equal in terms of cost synergies, i.e., θd = θc, cross-
border mergers are preferred when α is suﬃciently high. Consider the limit α → 1. In
this case, there is no welfare cost of leaving positive profits in equilibrium and the welfare
ranking is fully explained by the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of merger on national regulators’
rent-shifting incentives. With domestic mergers, rent-shifting incentives cause regulators
to set marginal access prices below marginal transportation costs, which reduces total
industry rents. With cross-border mergers, on the other hand, the Prisoners’ Dilemma
characteristics of the non-cooperative equilibrium are less pronounced, since the negative
externality between domestic plants (which are owned by diﬀerent firms) counteracts the
national regulators’ rent-shifting incentives. This contributes to higher total industry
profits in equilibrium, compared with the case of domestic mergers.
The arguments in this subsection make it clear that the results regarding welfare
comparisons are general, and not dependent on the particular functional forms used in the
analysis. The main reason for employing those special functional forms is to facilitate the
analysis in the next subsection, where one needs to examine whether it can be the case
that cross-border mergers are welfare improving (due to, say, large fixed costs K) and at
the same time leave rents to firms (which requires that fixed costs cannot be too large).
6.1 Is international policy coordination beneficial?
Let us now turn to the question of whether or not international harmonisation of access
regulation is desirable. The basic idea here is that diﬀerent policy regimes might imply
diﬀerent market structures in equilibrium. Assume that the countries can commit to a
particular policy regime at the outset of the game, before firms make their merger decisions.
In this case, we know that no mergers will be undertaken if regulation is transnationally
coordinated. If regulation policies are not coordinated, however, there may be incentives
for cross-border mergers. We consider the case where the equilibrium market structure is
two cross-border mergers under non-cooperative regulation. From Proposition 2, we know
that this amounts to assuming either that regulation is discriminatory and K < K, or
that eK < K < K.
In this case, the question of whether or not to coordinate regulation policies across bor-
ders introduces the following trade-oﬀ. Non-cooperative regulation implies that national
regulators engage in a Prisoners’ Dilemma type of policy game, due to the incentives for
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using access prices as instruments for strategic trade policy purposes. These incentives
are eradicated by international harmonisation. On the other hand, such harmonisation
will remove private incentives for potentially welfare improving mergers. An evaluation of
this trade-oﬀ reduces to a comparison of welfare in the non-cooperative regulation regime
with cross-border mergers and the cooperative regime without mergers.
Proposition 5 If θc > θ∗ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a critical value K∗ < K such that inter-
national coordination of regulation policies is not beneficial for K ∈
¡
K∗,K
¢
.
In light of the welfare trade-oﬀ outlined above, the intuition behind this result is
straightforward. If merger synergies — in absolute terms — are suﬃciently high, the social
benefit of inducing welfare improving mergers outweigh the cost of the negative exter-
nalities suﬀered in a non-harmonised regulation regime. On the other hand K cannot
be too large, because then the threat of shifting production between the plants in an
internationally merged firm is not eﬀective.
The relative magnitudes of the diﬀerent regimes can be illustrated by considering
a specific numerical example. Assume that a = 10, b = c = 1, and α = 0.8. This
yields θ∗ = 0.38. Thus, for any θ > 0.38 there is a possibility that international policy
coordination is not beneficial. Now assume that θ = 0.8. In this case, we have that
K∗ = 2.73 and K = 5.47, implying that policy coordination is not beneficial if K ∈
(2.73, 5.47). In this example and for K = 5 policy coordination yields welfare Wj = 1.11
while non-coordination yields welfare W cj = 3.47, implying that the latter alternative
allows a significant fraction of potential cost savings (θK = 4) to be realised and reflected
in improved welfare.
7 Concluding remarks
In many industries national regulators try to regulate the activities of firms that are active
in international markets. Could this imply that firms choose international mergers over
domestic ones, because this gives an opportunity to pit national regulators against each
other — even if a domestic merger would have been better at realising merger synergies?
Would this in turn imply that international policy coordination is called for?
We have sought to answer these questions within the framework of a model of access
regulation. There are two producers in each of two countries, all producing for consump-
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tion in a third-country market. This third market can only be reached by a transportation
network where national regulators set the access price. The access price has a two-part
nature with a per-unit price and a lump-sum fee. Regulation takes place under full infor-
mation. International cooperative regulation will then confiscate all profit from the firms
and maximise joint cartel profit. The problem is that no mergers will take place regardless
of the size of possible merger synergies, precisely because all profits from this would be
confiscated in the end. Under non-cooperative regulation, a firm’s only chance to rescue
some profits is to merge internationally. The power of the one national regulator is then
weakened by the threat that the firm could move production to the jurisdiction of the
other national regulator. We show that lack of policy coordination can actually be welfare
improving: True, some profits are left in the hands of the firms, but on the upside, some
merger synergies are actually realised.
We have chosen the access regulation framework because we think it can be descriptive
of some important real markets, such as gas and electricity markets, but also because it
lends to a relatively simple statement of our main findings. We do think, however, that the
main logic behind our results will be mirrored in many other regulation situations, where
production and regulation in one country is linked to what happens in another regulated
economy, on the market side or the cost side. Take, for example, environmental regulation.
Assume that polluting firms that produce for a world market must pay environmental taxes
in order to be allowed to operate. The ‘licence to operate’ can be seen as the provision
of ‘access’. Clearly, an international merger would in such a setting give rise to much the
same opportunities to play domestic regulators out against each other as in the present
model. Regulation theory has come a long way the last two decades, and even multi-
principal regulation is by now a relatively large research topic. We nevertheless think that
questions about how multi-principal regulation influences merger activity and what this
in turn signifies for regulatory policy are underresearched — and the present quite simple
model is just a first attack on this kind of questions.
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A Mobility constraints under non-cooperative regulation
Consider the case of two cross-border mergers. Using (25) and (26) from Section 4, the
mobility constraints for national regulators can be expressed as
TA ≤
(ac− (c+ 3b)wA + 3bwB) (γac− βwA + φbwB)
2c (6b+ c)2 (6b2 + c2 + 6bc)2
, (A.1)
TB ≤
(ac− (c+ 3b)wB + 3bwA) (γac− βwB + φbwA)
2c (6b+ c)2 (6b2 + c2 + 6bc)2
, (A.2)
where
β := c5 + 17bc4 + 110b2c3 + 328b3c2 + 432b4c+ 216b5,
φ := 3c4 + 38bc3 + 168b2c2 + 312b3c+ 216b4,
and γ is defined in Section 4. By using (A.1)-(A.2) in the regulators’ maximisation prob-
lems, we derive (27) and (28), given in Section 4.
B Social welfare in the symmetric market structure equi-
libria
Using the equilibrium access prices derived in the main body of the paper, equilibrium
expressions for social welfare in the symmetric market structures, under the two diﬀerent
regulatory regimes, are given as follows.
B.1 Coordinated regulation
No mergers:
Wj =
a2
8b+ c
− 2K. (B.1)
Domestic mergers:
W dj =
a2
8b+ c
− (2− θd)K. (B.2)
Cross-border mergers:
W cj =
a2
8b+ c
− (2− θc)K. (B.3)
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B.2 Non-cooperative regulation
No mergers:
Wj =
¡
7bc+ 4b2 + c2
¢
(3b+ c) a2
(7b+ c)2 (2b+ c)2
− 2K. (B.4)
Domestic mergers:
W dj =
¡
8bc+ 8b2 + c2
¢
(4b+ c) a2
(10bc+ 20b2 + c2)2
− (2− θd)K. (B.5)
Cross-border mergers:
W cj =
a2 (c+ 3b)
¡
6b2 + c2 + 6bc
¢2 ¡cχ+ 12αb3 (4b+ 3c) ¡9b2 + 6bc+ 2c2¢¢
(αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
(B.6)
−α (2− θc)K,
where
χ := c5 + 19bc4 + 6c3αb2 + 130b2c3 + 392b3c2 + 504b4c+ 216b5
and ν and ' have been defined in Section 4.
C Proofs
All proofs require only quite straightforward algebra. However, some of the algebra is
extremely tedious and thus omitted. In these cases, we only provide a main sketch of the
proof.14
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Inserting the equilibrium access price, (27)-(28), into (26), equilibrium profits for an in-
ternationally merged firm m, under non-cooperative regulation, is given by
πcm =
2a2bν (c+ 3b)2
¡
6b2 + c2 + 6bc
¢2
(αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
− (2− θc)K, (C.1)
where ν and ' are defined in Section 4. It follows straightforwardly that πcm > 0 ifK < K,
where
K :=
2a2bν (c+ 3b)2
¡
6b2 + c2 + 6bc
¢2
(2− θc) (αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
. (C.2)
For K > K, all profits are extracted through the fixed fees in equilibrium. ¥
14The ‘nitty gritty’ of the calculations are available from the authors upon request.
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Given our assumptions about merger formation, parts (i) and (ii) of the Proposition follow
immediately from the analysis of Sections 3 and 4. To prove part (iii) of the Proposition,
we need to derive the equilibrium with a single cross-border merger. Assume that firms 1
and 3 merge. If the merged firms supply the good from both countries, profits are given
by
π1+3 =
2ac (4b+ c) (c+ b)2 (a− wA − wB) + (c+ 2b) δ
¡
w2A + w
2
B
¢
− 4bξwAwB
2c (c2 + 7cb+ 8b2)2
(C.3)
− (2− θc)K − TA − TB,
where
δ := c3 + 8bc2 + 21b2c+ 16b3,
ξ := 14bc2 + 27b2c+ 2c3 + 16b3,
Profits of the non-participating firms are given by
π2 =
(c+ 2b)
¡
a (c+ b) (c+ 2b)− wA
¡
c2 + 5b (c+ b)
¢
+ bwB (2c+ 3b)
¢2
2 (c+ b)2 (c2 + 7cb+ 8b2)2
(C.4)
−K − TA,
π4 =
(c+ 2b)
¡
a (c+ b) (c+ 2b)− wB
¡
c2 + 5b (c+ b)
¢
+ bwA (2c+ 3b)
¢2
2 (c+ b)2 (c2 + 7cb+ 8b2)2
(C.5)
−K − TB.
On the other hand, if the merged firm chooses to supply the good only from country j, it
will realise a profit of
bπ1+3 (j) = (2b+ c) (a (c+ b)− wj (c+ 2b) + w−jb)2
2 (c+ b)2 (c+ 4b)2
− (2− θc)K − Tj . (C.6)
Imposing the mobility conditions π1+3 ≥ bπ1+3 (j), equilibrium access regulation is char-
acterised by
wj =
abcρ
ψ
, (C.7)
Tj =
ϑ2
¡
64b4 + 102b3c+ 53c2b2 + 12c3b+ c4
¢
(4b+ c)2 a2c
2ψ2
, (C.8)
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where
ψ : = 2c6αb+ 25c5αb2 + 123c4αb3 + 305c3αb4 + 360c2αb5 + 160cαb6 − 2c7
−43c6b− 355c5b2 − 1472c4b3 − 3312b4c3 − 4000b5c2 − 2368b6c− 512b7,
ρ : = 2c5α+ 25αbc4 + 123αb2c3 + 305αb3c2 + 360αb4c
+160b5α− 3c5 − 32bc4 − 121b2c3 − 196b3c2 − 112b4c,
ϑ := 2c3 + 10bc2 + 13b2c+ 4b3.
Equilibrium profits are given by
π1+3 =
(c+ 2b) (c+ 4b)2
¡
c2 + 7cb+ 8b2
¢2 ϑ2a2
2ψ2
− (2− θc)K, (C.9)
π2 = π4 =
(c+ 4b)2 ϑ2b
¡
2c4 + 23c3b+ 98c2b2 + 192cb3 + 128b4
¢
a2
2ψ2
−K. (C.10)
The profitability of a second cross-border merger, i.e., a merger between firms 2 and
4, are determined by a comparison of (C.1) and (C.10). It turns out that a second merger
is profitable if K > eK, where eK := 2z
θc
, (C.11)
where
z :=
a2b2 (A+B)
2Λ2Υ2
,
Λ : = −αc5b− 12αc4b2 − 52αc3b3 − 102αc2b4 − 72αcb5 + 648b6 + 1548b5c
+1500b4c2 + 728b3c3 + 182b2c4 + 22bc5 + c6,
Υ : = −2c6αb− 25c5αb2 − 123c4αb3 − 305c3αb4 − 360c2αb5 − 160cαb6 + 2c7
+43bc6 + 355b2c5 + 1472b3c4 + 3312b4c3 + 4000b5c2 + 2368b6c+ 512b7,
and A > 0 and B > 0 are functions of the parameters c, b and α.15 ,16
15A := 1735 729 742 848b17c6α+120 415 319 936b11c12α+1935 533 861 120b16c7α+213 362 933 760b20c3α+
1194 520 307 712b18c5α + 1699 171 258 048b15c8α + 896 007 057 408b19c4 + 4c23 + 1528 823 808b23 +
368 730 048 704b12c11 + 134 842 288b6c17 + 328 550 296b7c16α + 540b2c21α + 16848b3c20α +
19619 905 536b22c + 254bc22 + 54 584 646 208b10c13 + 324 576b4c19α + 8bc22α + 9569 185 592b9c14α +
4586 471 424b22cα+1978 929 564b8c15α+680 525 003 824b13c10α+1261 102 331 120b14c9+4344 742b5c18α+
46140 751 872b21c2α > 0
16B := 6b3c20

23 411− 107α2

+ 3072b18c5

499 195 156− 23 906 873α2

+
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It follows that the market structure with two cross-border mergers dominates all other
market structures if K ∈
³ eK,K´. It remains to establish when eK < K, if at all. We
see that ∂ eK/∂θc < 0 while ∂K/∂θc > 0, implying that ∂ ³K − eK´ /∂θc > 0. From
(C.2) and (C.11), it is immediately clear that limθc→0
³
K − eK´ < 0. It is also relatively
straightforward to show that limθc→1
³
K − eK´ > 0.17 Thus, there exists a critical valueeθ ∈ (0, 1), such that K > eK if θc > eθ.¥
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Comparing (B.4) and (B.5), the market structure with two domestic mergers yields
higher welfare than the decentralised structure if
16b4
¡
92b3 + c3 + 69b2c+ 15bc2
¢
a2
(7b+ c)2 (10bc+ 20b2 + c2)2 (2b+ c)2
+ θdK > 0. (C.12)
We see that this is always true. Comparing (B.4) and (B.6), the market structure with
two cross-border mergers yield higher welfare than the decentralised structure if
−a2 (c+ 3b) b
Ã
Ψ (2b+ c)2 + αν
¡
αc2b
¡
7bc+ 4b2 + c2
¢
ν − 2 (2b+ c)ϑ
¢
(αcbν − (2b+ c)')2 (7b+ c)2 (2b+ c)2
!
+(2 (1− α) + αθc)K > 0, (C.13)
where
Ψ : = 2c11 + 79c10b+ 1377c9b2 + 14 010c8b3 + 92 616c7b4
+417 892c6b5 + 1310 220c5b6 + 2837 016c4b7
+4117 104c3b8 + 3770 064c2b9 + 1940 112cb10 + 419 904b11,
ϑ : = 10 584b8 + 30 780b7c+ 37 188b6c2 + 24 564b5c3
+9874b4c4 + 2469b3c5 + 370b2c6 + 30bc7 + c8,
64b17c6

31 517 155 826− 1861 535 989α2

+ 32b15c8

56 001 585 723− 4105 657 918α2

+
442 368b20c3

867 485− 18 823α2

+ 12b2c21

630− α2

+ 30c18b5

594 090− 8471α2

+
2654 208b21c2

42 209− 386α2

+ 24b10c13α (1564 843 467− 123 681 643α) +
16b11c12

9657 055 901− 604 759 269α2

+ 96b13c10

7738 786 193− 571 981 103α2

+
2b7c16

407 051 276− 11 529 975α2

+ 73 728b19c4α (8229 019− 426 466α) +
2b9c14

8091 477 332− 368 224 931α2

+ b4c19

1830 547− 16 152α2

+ 40b8c15

99 927 847− 3663 841α2

+
496b16c7

4249 438 476− 287 942 005α2

+ b6c17α (43 062 848− 2804 169α) +
16b12c11α (19 769 962 473− 1599 851 626α) + 96b14c9α (12 444 704 779− 989 888 295α) > 0
17The details of the calculations, which requires some very tedious, but straightforward, algebra, are
available from the authors upon request.
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and ν and ' are defined before. It is easily shown that the first term in (C.13) is monoton-
ically increasing in α, and positive (negative) for α = 1 (α = 0). Thus, since the second
term is non-negative, the inequality in (C.13) holds if α is suﬃciently high. If α is suf-
ficiently low, so that the first term is negative, K must be suﬃciently high to make the
inequality hold. The highest value K is allowed to take in this expression is K. It is easily
verified that the inequality holds for α = 0 and K = K. It follows that a suﬃciently high
value of K (within the relevant range) is always enough to make the inequality in (C.13)
hold.
(ii) Comparing (B.5) and (B.6), domestic mergers are preferred to cross-border merg-
ers, from a welfare-point-of-view, if
a2b
Φ+ αν
¡
αc2b (4b+ c)
¡
8bc+ 8b2 + c2
¢
ν − Ω
¢
(10bc+ 20b2 + c2)2 (αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
−K (2− θd − α (2− θc)) > 0, (C.14)
where
Ω : = 2c10 + 74bc9 + 1182b2c8 + 1180 032b7c3 + 1364 832b8c2 + 905 472b9c
+259 200b10 + 10 792b3c7 + 62 816b4c6 + 245 376b5c5 + 654 968b6c4,
Φ : = 28 452c11b3 + 28 301 024b7c7 + 231 221 376b10c4 + 256 016b4c10
+171 300 096b12c2 + 7883 368b6c8 + 155 414 640b9c5 + 2138b2c12
+1651 276b5c9 + 97bc13 + 71 663 616b13c+ 243 694 656b11c3
+76 655 168b8c6 + 13 436 928b14 + 2c14.
Setting θd = θc, the second term in (C.14) is always non-negative. The first term in (C.14)
is monotonically decreasing in α, and positive (negative) for α = 0 (α = 1). Thus, the
inequality never holds when α is suﬃciently high. When α is suﬃciently low, the sign of
the expression is a priori ambiguous. A higher value of K will reduce the likelihood that
the inequality holds. Inserting the extreme value in the upper limit of the relevant range,
K = K, it is easily shown that the expression in (C.14) is negative. Thus, even for α = 0,
the inequality holds only if K is suﬃciently low.¥
C.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Comparing (B.1) and (B.6), we find that harmonisation is not preferred if K > K∗, where
K∗ :=
a2b
¡
Θ+ αν
¡
αc2bν − σ
¢¢
(2 (1− α) + αθc) (8b+ c) (αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
, (C.15)
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where
σ : = 2c7 + 50bc6 + 502b2c5 + 2680b3c4 + 8328b4c3
+14 976b5c2 + 14 040b6c+ 5184b7,
Θ : = 77c10b+ 2605 104c4b7 + 3750 624c3b8 + 419 904b11 + 2c11
+1819 584cb10 + 3446 064c2b9 + 13 264c8b3 + 87 128c7b4
+1215 672c5b6 + 1318c9b2 + 390 892c6b5.
This case is only relevant if K∗ < K. From (C.2) and (C.15) we have that
K −K∗ = a2b −2by
2 + θc (u+ αcbντ)
(2− θc) z2 (2 (1− α) + αθc) (8b+ c)
, (C.16)
where
y : = c5α+ 12c4αb+ 52c3αb2 + 102c2αb3 + 72cαb4 + c5
+22bc4 + 160b2c3 + 480b3c2 + 576b4c+ 216b5,
u : = 77c10b+ 2605 104c4b7 + 3750 624c3b8 + 419 904b11
+2c11 + 1819 584cb10 + 3446 064c2b9 + 13 264c8b3
+87 128c7b4 + 1215 672c5b6 + 1318c9b2 + 390 892c6b5,
τ : = 2c5 + c5α+ 12c4αb+ 44bc4 + 52c3αb2 + 320b2c3
+102c2αb3 + 960b3c2 + 72cαb4 + 1152b4c+ 432b5,
z : = −αc5b− 12αc4b2 − 52αc3b3 − 102αc2b4 − 72αcb5 + 648b6
+1548b5c+ 1500b4c2 + 728b3c3 + 182b2c4 + 22bc5 + c6.
It can be shown that
¡
K −K∗
¢
is monotonically increasing in θ, and K−K∗ < 0 if θ = 0.
It is also easily confirmed that limθ→1
¡
K −K∗
¢
> 0. This implies that K∗ < K if θ is
above a critical level θ∗ < 1. From (C.16) we derive
θ∗ =
2by2
u+ αcbντ
. (C.17)
It can also be shown that eK < K∗ < K for θ > θ∗. ¥
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